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COMMENTS
PRISONER REPRESENTATIVE ORGANIZATIONS, PRISON REFORM, AND
JONES V. NORTH CAROLINA PRISONERS' LABOR UNION: AN ARGUMENT
FOR INCREASED COURT INTERVENTION IN PRISON ADMINISTRATION
INTRODUCTION
A movement to reform prisons is under way
which is challenging the current methods of prison
management. The battle is being waged between
prisoners and the administrators with the courts as
mediators. The prison reform movement is riding
a wave of popular support on a collision course
with the traditional custodial concerns of security-
conscious prison administrators. On the one hand,
criminologists have begun to understand better the
debilitating effects that a custodial environment
has on rehabilitation prognosis.' The relationship
between collective violence and inadequate com-
munication mechanisms has been well docu-
mented.2 Penologists are urging that prison inmates
be afforded a greater role in the operation and
administration of the institution that contains
them.3 More and moie commentators are recogniz-
ing the benefits, both to the rehabilitative process
and the maintenance of internal prison security,
offered by such prisoner grievance organizations as
prisoner unions and inmate advisory councils.
4
On the other hand, the legitimization of prisoner
grievance organizations promises to be resisted, if
not outrightly rejected, by prison administrators.
Admittedly, past failures in the development and
operation of prisoner grievance organizations have
provided reluctant prison administrators with am-
'See text accompanying notes 77-80 infra.
2 See text accompanying notes 81-93 infra.
As J. E. Baker, in THE RIGHT To PARTICIPATE, sum-
marized the recommendations of many penologists:
Whether or not the formalized structure of com-
munication is an advisory council or some other
method is really not important. What is important
is that correctional administrators recognize and
believe that communication with their charges is
vital to the proper functioning of the correctional
process. Just as the advisory council was an out-
growth of self-government, there is much evidence
of the evolvement of other forms of organizations in
which the inmate is being recognized as performing
an essential role in the correctional system.
J. E. BAKER, THE RIGHT To PARTICIPATE: INMATE IN-
VOLVEMENT IN PRISON ADMINISTRATION 250-51 (1974).
4 See text accompanying notes 94-98 infra.
pie grounds for rejecting the establishment of such
organizations in their own institutions. Only in the
past few years have realistic evaluations been made
with respect to the reasons for past failures, the
limitations ofgrievance organizations within prison
walls and the requirements for the effective and
continuous operation of mechanisms for handling
inmate complaints.'
Most recently, administrators reluctant to afford
inmates a greater voice in the day-to-day opera-
tions of the correctional institution received sup-
port from a source that has the power to bring the
prison reform movement to a standstill. In Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,6 the United
States Supreme Court assured the continued pres-
ence of the high custody prison7 when it ruled that
neither the first amendment nor the fourteenth
amendment is violated by state prison regulations
that forbid inmates from soliciting membership in
a prisoner labor union or from conducting union
meetings.' In applying the rational relation test of
due process, the Court found that such regulations
are reasonably related to legitimate prison security
concerns.9 And, as a basis for its decision, the Court
made clear that the judiciary must give appropri-
ate deference to the decisions of prison administra-
5 See note 91 infra. See also Comment, Labor Unions for
Prison Inmates: An Analysis of a Recent Proposal for the Orga-
nization of Inmate Labor, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 963, 966 n.13
(1972); Huff, Unionization Behind the Walls, 12 CRIMINOL-
OGY 175, 186, 189 (1974). But see Butler v. Preiser, 380 F.
Supp. 612, 621 n.1 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
433 U.S. 119 (1977).
'The term "high custody prison" refers to an organi-
zational structure found in most American prisons, in
which coercion is the major means of control over inmates
and high alienation characterizes the orientation of most
of the prisoners to the system. Geneally speaking, the
tasks of the prison organization, i.e. keeping inmates in
and maintaining discipline, are accomplished through
the potential or actual use of force. A. ETzIoNi, A CoM-
PARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS (1961)
reprinted in R. LEGER & J. STRATTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
CORRECTIONS 9-10 (1977). See also text accompanying
notes 66-76 infta.
8433 U.S. at 121.
9 Id. at 129.
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tors when issues concerning inmate custody and
care are before the court. The Court noted that:
courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly
urgent problems of prison administration and re-
form.... ThE necessary and correct result of our
deference to the informed discretion of prison ad-
ministrators permits them, and not the courts, to
make the difficult judgments concerning institu-
tional operations in situations such as this.'
0
Prior to Jones, the Court had balanced the ad-
ministration's security interests against the consti-
tutional rights of prison inmates in determining
the legality of prison reforms. But, through the
Jones mandate, the Court critically disabled recent
trends in prison reform, for it is contended that so
long as courts blindly defer to the judgment of
prison administrators, whose success is judged not
in terms of the number of inmates treated or
rehabilitated, but rather in terms of the number of
inmates securely contained in the institution,
prison administrators will not risk adopting reforms
that could upset the order and regimen of the
custodial institution. Furthermore, it is this au-
thor's position that the Court's deferential attitude
toward the custodialconcerns of prison administra-
tors is a dangerous departure from its past history
of active judicial review of regulatory actions by
state officials. By relegating a prison reform such
as inmate unions to the absolute control of security-
minded prison officials, the Court has sacrificed a
prisoner's fundamental rights of free speech and
association to the mere allegation of a custodial
concern for order and discipline. And finally, the
Jones decision portends a continuing incidence of
collective violence in correctional institutions and
the chronic failure of prison treatment programs.
At a time when penologists are urging that inmate
organizations be utilized to increase communica-
tion between inmates and the administration, the
Jones Court has all but assured the survival of
prisons characterized by inadequate communica-
tion and counterproductive treatment environ-
ments."
10Id. at 126-28 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 405 (1974)).
1 From their inception, prisons have come under con-
tinuous attack because of the belief that the general
conditions of confinement are not conducive to attempts
to rehabilitate prison inmates.
In recent years, prison administrators have emphasized
their intent to promote rehabilitation, and substantial
funds have been allocated to vocational training, educa-
tional programs, and a variety of treatment modalities.
This comment will discuss the changing position
which the court has assumed with regard to judicial
intrusion into the corrections system. Additionally,
it will demonstrate that the Court's increased de-
ference to the security concerns of prison adminis-
trators suggests an unfortunate and possibly dan-
gerous departure from its recent active role in the
management of custodial institutions. At a time
when more and more correctional specialists are
recognizing the inmate's need to speak out on
prison conditions and take a more active role in the
development and construction of his prison envi-
ronment, the Court's deferential attitude promises
to delay the process by which inmates can acquire
greater control over their lives within the prison.
In spite of humanitarian changes in methods of treating
criminal offenders, prisons have failed to achieve the
utilitarian goals of reformation and deterrence. The rea-
sons for this failure do not lend themselves to easy cata-
loguing, but one cause that commentators are becoming
increasingly concerned about is that "prisons as formal
organizations have really not changed significantly. Ini-
tially established to provide custodial control over those
assigned to them, their basic structure has undergone
relatively little change even though the goals they purport
to seek have changed quite extensively." C. THOMAS &
D. PETERSON, PRISON ORGANIZATION AND INMATE SUBCUL-
TURFS 20-21 (1977).
It is generally recognized that the structure and daily
operation of most prisons in this country reflect the
continuing dominance of custodial concerns. See notes
66-76 and accompanying text infra. But only recently
have commentators realized that there is a strong corre-
lation between inmate resistance to rehabilitative efforts
and the administration's emphasis on custodial concerns.
Researchers are increasingly convinced that:
To the extent.that an oppositional inmate subcul-
ture has emerged within prison organizations, and
to the extent that new inmates are effectively in-
ducted into that subculture when they enter the
institution, they become increasingly more insulated
from and resistant to any attempts on the part of
the staff of the institution that might otherwise
encourage them to become meaningfully involved
in activities aimed at their treatment, rehabilitation,
or resocialization.
C. Tsiomms & D. PETERSON, supra at 17.
Inmate participation in treatment programs imple-
mented by prison administrators has been found to have
little or no effect on the probability of the return of those
inmates to criminal behavior when they are released. See
P. LERMAN, COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND SOCIAL ComToL
(1975); G. KASSEBAUM, D. WARD & D. WILNER, PRISON
TREATMENT AND PAROLE SURVIVAL: AN EMPIRICAL As-
ESSMENT (1971); Bailey, Correctional Outcome: An Evaluation
of 100 Reports, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 153 (1966); D.
GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRIsoN AND PAROLE
SYSTEM (1964). Simply, commentators now believe that
instituting treatment programs in custodially oriented
prisons is an unnecessary waste of time, money and
personnel. See notes 77-80 and accompanying text infra.
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THE DEVELOPING ROLE OF THE COURT IN PRISON
REFORM
To appreciate fully the effect that Jones had on
prisoner organizations and may have on prison
reform in general, one must understand the
changes in the courts' treatment of issues concern-
ing prison conditions and prisoner rights. For years,
the judiciary adopted a hands-off policy when
asked to review prisoners' complaints. The courts
felt that they did not have the power to interfere
with the conduct of the prison or its disciplinary
methods and that they lacked the expertise to
superintend the treatment of prisoners in correc-
tional institutions.12 In recent years, however,
armed with an increased awareness of the deplor-
able conditions of prisons, 3 the courts began to
take a closer look at correction officials' actions,
and assumed a more active role in the management
of the institutions. The courts no longer awaited
the extreme case before asserting their power.
14
12 This basis for a "hands-off" approach is often sug-
gested, rather than stated. See, e.g., Fussa v. Taylor, 168
F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Pa. 1958); Peretz v. Humphrey, 86
F. Supp. 706 (M.D. Pa. 1949).
More recent cases have sometimes adopted a modified
"hands-off' approach, excluding review of all matters of
prison administration unless these administrative powers
were exercised in a clearly arbitrary or abusive manner.
See, e.g., Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504 (10th Cir. 1969);
McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964);
United States v. Blierley, 331 F. Supp. 1182 (W.D. Pa.
1971).
'
3 Courts have become more aware of the conditions
inside prison walls if for no other reason than that since
1960 inmates have petitioned the courts in increasing
numbers for the redress of grievances concerning treat-
ment in custodial institutions. A significant milestone was
reached in 1961 when the Supreme Court, in Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), paved the way for prisoners
incarcerated in state prisons to seek redress in federal
courts for alleged violations of their rights by prison
officials. The decision opened prisons and their policies
to judicial scrutiny on a broad scale. The federal courts
heard complaints about arbitrary rules, overcrowded and
inhumane living conditions, lack of medical care and the
absence of educational and recreational facilities at
prisons. Federal courts now receive annually about 17,000
petitions filed by prisoners, and about one-fourth of these
cases deal with allegations that an inmate's civil rights
have been denied in prison. Tia Denenberg, Prison Grim-
ance Procedures, I CORREcTiONS MAGAZINE 29, 30 (1975).
"
4 The court, in Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127,
132 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other grounds, 460 F.2d
126 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972), partially
explained the reasons for this change when it wrote:
[Ilt is clear that State prisons, or even local jails
have become more and more, and rightly so, in this
age proper subjects for scrutiny by representatives
of the public and the courts when ncessary.... No
longer can prisons and their inmates be considered
The first inroads on the courts' hands-off ap-
proach to prison conditions came in Coffin v. Rei-
chard.'5 In Coffin, a prisoner filed a writ of habeas
corpus alleging that at the time he entered a plea
of guilty and signed a confession, he was physically
ill and mentally incapable of intelligently discuss-
ing his case with his attorney. The district court
refused to grant the inmate's leave to file his peti-
tion on the ground that the inmate was not entitled
to the writ. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court -decision and established
the basic standard by which many future prisoners'
rights cases would be decided. As the court noted,
"A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary
citizen except those expressly, or by necessary im-
plication taken from him by law.'
16
The standard developed by the Coffin court has
been modified and clarified in the context of re-
viewing restrictions on first amendment rights. For
instance, in Carothers v. Follette,17 a case involving
the punishment of a prisoner for including state-
ments critical of the prison administration in letters
to his family, the court expressed the standard as
"[A]ny prison regulation or practice which restricts
the right of free expression that a prisoner would
have enjoyed if he had not been imprisoned must
be related both reasonably ... and necessarily ...
to the advancement of some justifiable purpose of
imprisonment.' 8 Still other courts have ruled that
prison officials cannot interfere with first amend-
ment rights unless the state can show "a compelling
state interest centering about prison security, or a
clear and present danger of a breach of prison
security, or some substantial interference with or-
derly institutional administration."' 9
During this period of increased judicial review
of prison conditions, two important decisions con-
cerning prisoner representative organizations were
a closed society with every internal disciplinary
judgment to be blissfully regarded as immune from
the limelight that all public agencies ordinarily are
subject to.
For a brief exposition of the "hands-off" doctrine and its
demise, see Fox, The First Amendment Rights of Prisoners, 63
J. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 162 (1972).
15 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert denied, 325 U.S. 887
(1945).
16 Id. at 445.
'7314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
8 Id. at 1024 (footnote and citations omitted).
'
9 Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237, 1244 (2d Cir.
1972) (quoting Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp.
901, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)). Accord, Butler v. Preiser, 380
F. Supp. 612,620 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The test used by these
courts was probably derived from United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
COMMENTS [Vol. 70
handed down. In Goodwin v. Oswald,o the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a warden of a
state prison could not withhold mail sent to inmate
union members by a legal aid society, detailing the
steps being taken on behalf of the union.2 ' Al-
though the court did not directly rule on the
legality of the prisoner organization itself, the
judges found that there was no "compelling state
interest" to justify the interference with "preferred
freedoms of individuals."22 The court noted that
the union had not yet urged inmates either to
change their work habits or present any demands
to prison administrators, and thus that no factual
basis supported the fear of the prison officials that
the letters would impair the orderly management
of the institution. The court based its decision on
the sixth amendment's right to counsel and the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection guaran-
tees.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Oakes made
clear that fie favored the formation of prisoner
unions to represent inmates and to channel their
grievances to the correctional administration. Sig-
nificantly, he wrote:
[TJhe tragic experience at Attica would make cor-
rectional officials, an observer might think, seek
more peaceful ways of resolving prison problems
than the old, ironclad, solitary-confinement, mail
censoring, dehumanizing methods that have worked
so poorly in the past. Promoting, or at least permit-
ting the formation of a representative agency might
well be, in the light of past experience, the wisest
course for correctional officials to follow.'
In National Prisoners Reform Association v. Sharkey,"
a federal district court was asked to decide whether
an inmate organization interested in improving
prison conditions25 posed such a substantial threat
to the security of the prison that officials could
properly prohibit the group from meeting. In that
case, the inmates had asserted that their first
20 462 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1972).
2' The constitution of the prisoner union set forth as
union goals "the advancement of the economic, political,
social and cultural interests of the prisoners, the adoption
of laws increasing the welfare of prisoners, and the equal-
ization of the rights of prison labor and free labor by
expansion and recognition of the former." 462 F.2d at
1241.
22 Id. at 1244 (citations omitted).
2 Id. at 1245-46 (Oakes, J., concurring).
2 347 F. Supp. 1234 (D.R.I. 1972).
' The National Prisoners Reform Association's gen-
eral goals were to "improve prison conditions and to
make people outside of the prison aware of conditigns
within." 347 F. Supp. at 1236.
amendment rights to associate and petition for
redress of grievances were violated by the ban. The
court granted a temporary injunction because the
state had failed to prove that the restrictions on
alleged first amendment freedoms furthered "an
important or substantial governmental interest.,,
26
Although the court, in issuing the temporary in-
junction, did not have to decide whether the plain-
tiff inmates actually retained a first amendment
freedom to associate in prison, the court did ac-
knowledge that "[tihere is a high probability that,
on the merits, it will be found that there is a First
Amendment right to associate.'
27
In 1974, the Supreme Court in Procunier v. Mar-
tinez,2s developed a standard of review for those
prison regulations which limit the first amend-
ment's freedom of speech. Although the Court
recognized that "First Amendment guarantees
must be applied in light of the special characteris-
tics of the environment,"' 2 the Court declined to
consider whether inmates themselves retain a first
amendment freedom to uncensored correspond-
ence with outsiders. Instead, the Court claimed
that censorship of inmate mail imposed a restric-
tion on the first (and fourteenth) amendment rights
of those outside the prison walls who are writing to
inmates. The Court then established a test for
determining whether a particular prison rule relat-
ing to inmate correspondence imposed an imper-
missable restraint on first amendment freedoms.
According to the Court, for a restraint to be valid,
the regulation must further one of the "substantial
governmental interests of security, order and re-
habilitation," and the limitations of first amend-
ment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary
or essential to the protection of the particular
governmental interest involved.30 Using this test,
the Court concluded that the challenged prison
mail censorship regulation was broader than the
legitimate interests of the penal administration
required 3' and hence was invalid.
' Id. at 1238 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
27 Id. at 1238.
28416 U.S. 396 (1974).
2 Id. at 409-10 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines School
District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
'o Id. at 413.
"
1Justices Marshall and Brennan, concurring in the
judgment of the Court, wrote a separate opinion empha-
sizing that prisoners should have free access to the mails
not as a privilege, but rather as a consititutionally guar-
anteed right. They would have accordingly found that
"prison authorities may not read inmate mail as a matter
of course." 416 U.S. at 422 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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In Pell v. Procunier,32 the Court had an opportu-
nity to define further the governmental interests
that could legitimately be served by prison regu-
lations. However, unlike Martinez, the Pell Court's
balancing of interests swung to the favor of the
prison officials. In that case, inmates at a state
prison objected on first amendment grounds to a
prison regulation restricting press interviews with
individual inmates.33 While recognizing that a
prison inmate "retains the First Amendment rights
that are not inconsistent with his status as a pris-
oner or with the legitimate penological objectives
of the corrections system,"' 4 the Court noted that
first amendment restrictions in the prison were to
be analyzed in light of the functions of the correc-
tions system. The Court recognized three interests
served by the prison structure: the deterrence of
crime, the rehabilitation of those committed to
custody, and the maintenance of internal security.
Having balanced the free speech rights of inmates
against the state's interest in confining prisoners
and maintaining security within the prison walls,
the Court then recognized that since alternative
channels of communication were open to the in-
mate petitioners in Pell, their first amendment
rights of free speech were not violated by the
challenged prison regulations.
After Pell and Martinez, two district courts ruled
on the legality of prison regulations that affected
the development of inmate organizations and con-
tinued to utilize a balancing test. In both Paka v.
Manson' and North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union v.
Jones,36 the courts reviewed the asserted rights of
inmate plaintiffs vis-a-vis the governmental inter-
ests developed in Procunier and applied in Pell.
In Paka, inmates organized in order to present
their grievances to the administration and to for-
mulate proposals for operation of the prison. The
administration countered by placing certain in-
mate leaders in isolation, transferring others out of
the prison, and intercepting union-related mail.
The inmates challenged the actions of the admin-
istration and claimed in a class-action suit to have
s24 17 U.S. 817 (1974).
33 Media plaintiffs, in Pell, also asserted that the prison
regulation unlawfully infringed upon their newsgathering
activity in violation of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments. 417 U.S. at 821. In rejecting this assertion, the
Court found that the media had available to it other
means by which it could obtain access to the prison to
gather information for stories. 417 U.S. at 824-25.
34417 U.S. at 822.
387 F. Supp. 111 (D. Conn. 1974).
3 409 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.N.C. 1976), rev'd, 433 U.S.
119 (1977).
a right to organize a union and function as a
unified group within the prison. The court adopted
the Supreme Court's analysis in Pell and considered
the issue in terms of a "balance between the interest
of the prisoners in associating together within an
in-prison union and the interest of the state in
maintaining internal security within the prison."
37
Despite expert testimony to the contrary,s the
court found that a prisoners' union would pose a
substantial threat to the security of the prison to
justify restrictions on the first amendment rights of
inmates to associate.
In Jones, the district court did not have to decide
whether prisoners had a constitutional right to join
a prisoners' union since the prison authorities had
already permitted the" union to be organized.
Rather, the court only had to address the issue of
whether prison officials could legitimately forbid
solicitation of membership in the union by prison
organizers. Applying the Pell tests the court could
find no basis for concluding that a ban on the
solicitation of union membership was essential to
the security of the prison. In a carefully worded,
narrowly stated finding, the court held that the
prison officials, "having permitted membership in
a union committed to peaceful means to effect
change and reform, may not at the same time
forbid solicitation of membership." 4
Even before the Supreme Court ruled on the
appeal in Jones, inmates asserting a constitutional
right to organize a prisoners' union in a correc-
tional institution had little precedent upon which
to rely: No court had yet taken that major step of
recognizing the first amendment rights of inmates
to organize a union in light of the government's
interest in deterrence, rehabilitation, and security.
In both Sharkey and Jones, the courts supported the
existence of the union, but only in language limited
to and conceivably compelled by the facts of the
case. In each of those cases, the union was already
in operation and had shown itself not to be a threat
to internal prison security. A ruling against the
union would have involved a retraction of freedoms
3 387 F. Supp. at 115.
3 Id. at 119.
3 It is not clear whether the court, in Jones, interpreted
the Pell test differently than did the Paka court. While
Paka balanced the first amendment interests of the in-
mates against the government's penological objectives,
the Jones court described the test as allowing full first
amendment freedom of speech to inmates as long as it
did not "conflict with legitimate penological objectives
of the institution." 409 F. Supp. at 943.
40 409 F. Supp. at 944.
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previously extended rather than a refusal to extend
additional privileges. 4'
Further, no court had yet supported the notion
that a prison union was an effective method of
keeping prison officials attuned to problems in the
institution and of preserving security by defusing
crises before they erupted. 2 Indeed, the Pell deci-
sion may have heralded a return to the hands-off
doctrine so popular among courts before the 1970's.
In Jones, the district court declined to characterize
association of inmates as either "good or bad."' '
The court limited its analysis to the situation where
the union had yet to disrupt the operation of the
penal institution and where no intent to interfere
with the administration was shown. The court in
Paka went even further by expressly avoiding the
question of whether a union could lessen tension
between inmates and the correctional staff. Accord-
ing to that court, "[Tihe simple and understanda-
ble demand that prisons should be better managed
is plainly a question of method, and prison admin-
istrators must be allowed to decide these difficult,
practical and philosophical questions of policy."
If the courts were suggesting that inmates' con-
stitutional freedoms could be limited by prison
administrators' pervasive fears about the security
of their institutions, then even before the Supreme
Court's opinion in Jones, one could have predicted
that prison unions had a questionable future. After
all, if the courts refused to analyze the positive
capabilities of a carefully structured prison orga-
nization, and only considered the alleged security
threat which unions may pose, then the first
amendment rights of inmates would lose out to the
"governmental interest" every time.
Consequently, if the rights of inmates to organize
grievance bodies or inmate unions were on shaky
constitutional ground after Martinez and Pell, the
Supreme Court's decision in Jones left no doubt
that inmates have no constitutional basis to assert
first amendment speech and associational rights
where a prison administrator fears that such orga-
nizations could be detrimental tO the maintenance
of order in the prison. Although the Jones Court
41 See Paka v. Manson, 387 F. Supp. 111, 124 n.19 (D.
Conn. 1974).
12 Only Oakes, concurring in Goodwin v. Oswald, 462
F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1972), acknowledged that promoting
the formation of a representative agency in the prison
might well be a way for prison officials to deal with
inmates' grievances. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
43 409 F. Supp. at 943.
U 387 F. Supp. at 125.
did find that first amendment associational rights
were implicated by a regulation prohibiting inmate
solicitation for a prisoner union, it struck the bal-
ance in favor of the "reasonable considerations of
penal management."4 Despite the fact that the
district court had found no evidence "that the
inmates intend to operate [the union] to hamper
and interfere with the proper interests of govern-
ment, '" or that the union posed a "present danger
to security and order," the Court found a rational
relationship between the ban on solicitation and
the legitimate objectives of the prison administra-
tion.
THE JONEs DEcISION AND THE FUTuRE OF
PRISONERs' RIGiS
The Supreme Court's decision injones will have
an impact on prisoners' rights that extends far
beyond the rights of inmates to organize within the
prison walls. Jones suggests that the Court may
have readopted a hands-off approach to prison
affairs where the fears or concerns of prison admin-
istrators can be used as a rationale for restricting
the first amendment freedoms of prison inmates.
The Court made it clear that "central to all other
correctional goals is the institutional consideration
of internal security within the correctional facilities
themselves.' 7* Having established that priority as
the touchstone for review of prison regulations, the
Court was able to sidestep the constitutional man-
dates of the first amendment by deferring to the
"informed discretion of prison administrators" in
making those "difficult judgments concerning in-
stitutional operations."" Under this view, so long
as administrators regard a particular inmate activ-
ity to be a threat to the internal security of the
institution, the Court must defer to the more in-
formed judgment of the administration, regardless
of the impact on the first amendment freedoms of
inmates. While under a balancing test like that
used in Pell, the Court would have weighed the
first amendment rights of inmates against the cus-
todial concerns of prison officials, the Court inJones
chose to consider only the security interests alleged
by the prison administration.
The Jones Court can be criticized for its unwise
decision to defer blindly to the administrative
4 433 U.S. at 132.
'North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union v. Jones,
409 F. Supp. 937, 944 (E.D.N.C. 1976), rev'd, 433 U.S.
119 (1977).
7 433 U.S. at 132 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 823 (1974)).
' Id. at 128 (quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 827).
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prison body. Admittedly, "the realities of running
a penal institution are complex and difficult,"49
and prison administrators possess considerably
more "professional expertise" 50 in prison manage-
ment than do judges. But it can be just as persua-
sively argued that the realities of running a school
or a city are also complex and that those charged
with these tasks-principals, college presidents,
mayors, councilpersons and law enforcement per-
sonnel-also possess special professional expertise.
Yet, the Court has not traditionally deferred to the
judgment of these officials simply because their
judgment was "rational." Indeed, whenever the
first amendment right to associate is jeopardized,
the Court has scrutinized allegations by state offi-
cials that certain concerted action threatens the
peace and security of the state.
For example, in Healy v. James,51 the Court ad-
dressed the issue of first amendment rights of as-
sociation in the university context. In that case,
students at a state-supported college, seeking to
form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS), were denied recognition as a cam-
pus organization by the college president. The
Court ruled that the president violated the peti-
tioners' first amendment associational rights be-
cause the record failed to support his fears'that the
organization would be a disruptive force on the
campus. The Court did not hesitate to review the
justifications asserted by the president for denying
recognition of the organization. Indeed, the Court
expressed a willingness to scrutinize closely an ad-
ministrator's justifications for actions that denied
associational privileges. As the Court noted, "while
a college has a legitimate interest in preventing
disruption on the campus, which under circum-
stances requiring the safeguarding of that interest
may justify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests
on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness
of that action."5 2
Similarly, in Cox v. Louisiana,' the Court found
that the leader of a civil rights demonstration in
Baton Rouge was deprived of his rights of free
49 Id. at 126.
o Id. at 128.
"' 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
52 Id. at 184. Of course, the analogy between the college
president and prison administrators cannot be carried
too far. Prisons are characterized by conditions that raise
unique problems concerning custody and security. How-
ever, it is still valid to point out that until its decision in
Jones, the Court never permitted security concerns of
institutional administrators to define the limits of the
freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment.
53 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
speech and free assembly in violation of the first
and fourteenth amendments when he was arrested
and convicted of disturbing the peace. The trial
court had recognized that the gathering of 1,500
black persons in a predominantly white business
district was "an inherently dangerous" condition,
and the state had contended that "violence was
about to erupt" before the demonstration was
ended by the police. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court overruled the leader's conviction, in part
because the record did not support the contention
that the demonstration constituted a breach of
peace. The Court made it clear that the commu-
nication of ideas by picketing and marching on
streets is not afforded the same kind of protection
under the first and fourteenth amendments as is
pure speech." Yet, the Court did not hesitate to
make an independent examination of the whole
record to determine whether the state statute was
both unconstitutionally vague in its scope and
discriminatorily applied by local officials.ss
In light of these cases exemplifying the active
judicial review of regulatory actions by state offi-
cials, one can only wonder why theJones Court felt
so overwhelmed by the complexity of the task of
managing a prison, as to ignore the traditional
balancing of interests. In addition to this inconsist-
ency, the Court's approach in Jones unwisely as-
sumed a deferential attitude. The goal of prisons,
in the eyes of the general public, as well as correc-
tional officials, is custodial control. Prison officials
are regarded as successful administrators as long as
violence,' assaults, escapes and riots are mini-
mized.;W In order to meet these custodial expecta-
54 Id. at,555.
65 See also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963).
56 To the extent that treatment programs do exist, they
are most frequently viewed as a secondary function sub-
ordinate to the custodial goals of the penal institution.
As two penologists have explained:
[The primary goals of prisons, in the eyes of the
general public as well as prison administrators, is
custodial control. They are evaluated and evaluate
themselves far more in terms of what does not go.on
.. within the prison than on what does go on. More
specifically, the absence of violence, assaults, riots,
escapes, potentially damaging litigation in the
courts, and so on are far more salient concerns than
the viability or presence of.rehabilitation or reso-
cialization programs whose effects are more intan-
gible, less a topic of major public concern, and far
less immediate.
C. THOMAS & D. PRmsoN, supra note 11, at 33. See also
G. SYKES, THE SocIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A
MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON (1958). Indeed, the Supreme
Court, in Jones, reminds us that "central to all other
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tions, it is not surprising, then, that prison admin-
istrators will impose more limitations on inmate
liberties than might seem necessary for the safe
operation of the institution, even if certain consti-
tutional freedoms might also be restricted.5 Justice
Marshall, dissenting in Jones, recognized this dan-
ger of deferring to prison administrators' institu-
tional decisions that present constitutional ques-
tions:
A warden seldom will find himself subject to public
criticism or dismissal because he needlessly repressed
free speech; indeed, neither the public nor the war-
den will have any way of knowing when repression
was unnecessary. But a warden's job can be jeop-
ardized and public criticism is sure to come should
disorder occur. Consequently, prison officials inev-
itably will err on the side of too little freedom.ss
Neither Justice Marshall nor this writer are sug-
gesting that the concerns of prison administrators
be ignored when courts adjudicate the constitu-
tional claims of prisoners. Courts are well ac-
quainted with evaluating the weight and validity
of informed opinions concerning matters in which
the court lacks expertise. However, the courts must
bear in mind that "the ultimate responsibility for
evaluating the prison officials' testimony, as well as
any other expert testimony, must rest with the
courts, which are required to reach an independent
judgment concerning the constitutionality of any
restriction on expressive activity.' ' 9 It is not enough
to say that problems such as prisoner unions and
inmate grievance organizations involve policy de-
cisions best left to the judgment of prison officials.
The very fact that first amendment rights are
restrained makes the decision more than an admin-
istrative problem. Instead, it places the courts in
the very position to which they are most accus-
tomed; that is, judging the constitionality of deci-
sions made by governmental authorities, in light of
the rights violated and the alternatives available
for promoting the governmental interests in the
least restrictive manner possible.
Assuming that prison officials are able to con-
correctional goals is the institutional consideration of
internal security within the correctional facilities them-
selves." 433 U.S. at 132 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974)).
57 The case law is replete with examples of prison
administrators adopting a security conscious attitude that
neglected to make any adequate provision for inmates'
due process rights. See CORRECTIONS, supra note 13, at 30.
58 433 U.S. at 141-42 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 142-43.
vince a court that a ban on inmate grievance
organizations is essential to the maintenance of
security and order within the prison, the court's
analysis should not just stop. Rather, the Supreme
Court in Martinez, imposed still another require-
ment for determining whether a particular prison
regulation imposes an impermissible restraint on
first amendment freedoms. The Martinez Court re-
quired that the limitation of first amendment free-
doms be no greater than necessary for the protec-
tion of the particular governmental interest as-
serted. In other words, if a court concludes that an
inmate association posed enough of a threat to the
security of the institution to warrant its restriction,
the court must ask whether a complete bar of the
organization is the measure that least restricts the
inmates' alleged first amendment liberties.
60
Commentators, and some courts, have recog-
nized that less restrictive limitations on prisoner
organizations exist which afford administrators
control over the accompanying security risk, while
preserving inmates' first amendment rights. A use-
ful analogy is the limitation which states place on
the freedom of public employees to act collectively.
In order for the states to protect the general public
from inconvenience and possible threats to safety,
public employees may be denied the right to strike.
Similarly, in the prison context, a prohibition on
strikes by inmates would be justified by consider-
ations of safety and order both inside and outside
the institution.1
One commentator has noted that "[l]imitations
60 Other courts have pointed out that the mere possi-
bility of some vague threat to a governmental interest
cannot justify wholesale restriction of first amendment
freedoms. In Butler v. Preiser, 380 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), inmates challenged a ban on the solicitation of
funds from inmates for the Attica Brothers Defense Fund
as a violation of their first amendment freedom to asso-
ciate. The court enjoined the prohibition, in part because
the correctional officials failed to show a clear and present
danger to prison security in the solicitation and associa-
tion of inmates within the institution. The court made
clear that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of dis-
turbance is not enough to overcome the right of.freedom
of expression." 380 F. Supp. at 620-21 (quoting Tinker
v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)). If
this same standard for review were applied to correctional
administrators' distrust of prisoner unions, the mere al-
legation of the possible security risk posed by such orga-
nizations should not outweigh inmates' first amendment
freedoms of speech and association.
61 See Comment, supra note 5, at 973. See also North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union v. Jones, 409 F. Supp.
937, 945 (E.D.N.C. 1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 119 (1977);
Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237, 1249 n.2 (2d Cir.
1972) (Friendly, C.J., dissenting).
as to the size, time, and location of meetings and
the 'revolving' representation of the union" might
be necessary in light of the organization of prison
life. 2 In Jones, the district court recognized the
necessity of these time, place and manner restric-
tions. While the lower court ordered the prison
administration to permit membership in a prison
union dedicated to peaceful reform and to allow
the solicitation of new members, the court also
limited the power. of the union by prohibiting
concerted action or organized resistance of prison
discipline, and by allowing prison officials to refuse
to negotiate or to contract with the prisoners' un-
ion.
63
However, the argument that there exist less re-
strictive alternatives to the complete abolition of
prisoner unions may have been mooted by the
Supreme Court's decision in jones. Recall that Mar-
tinez required that governmental regulations im-
posing restraints on first amendment freedoms both
further a substantial interest and be no greater than
necessary to protect the particular interest in-
volved. The Supreme Court in Jones eliminated the
second prong of the Martinez test by bootstrapping
it into the issue raised in the first prong. The Court
chose not to evaluate whether the ban on the
prisoner union solicitation was narrowly drawn.
Rather, the Court merely assumed that if the
custodial concerns, expressed by the prison admin-
istration in response to union solicitation, were
reasonable, then the regulations were presumed to
be "drafted no more broadly than they need be to
meet the perceived threat." 64 It seems then, that
afterjones, the sole test for determining whether a
prison regulation imposes an unconstitutional re-
straint on first amendment freedoms is whether the
prison administration can allege that the chal-
lenged regulation furthers the maintenance of in-
ternal security in the correctional facility.
Prior to Jones, prison inmates were assured of at
least minimal scrutiny of prison regulations that
allegedly infringed upon first amendment freedoms
of speech or assembly. In Martinez, the Court had
reaffirmed the belief that "a policy of judicial
restraint cannot encompass any failure to take
cognizance of valid constitutional claims... When
a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamen-
tal constitutional guarantee, federal courts will
62 See 21 BUFFALO L. REv., at 983.
63 North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union v. Jones,
409 F. Supp. 937, 945 (E.D.N.C. 1976), rev'd433 U.S. 119
(1977).
64 433 U.S. at 133.
discharge their duty to protect constitutional
rights."65 With Jones, however, the Court departed
from the philosophy sounded in Martinez and her-
alded a return to the hands-off doctrine where first
amendment rights of inmates are allegedly vio-
lated. On the one hand, it is suggested that this
approach is not only inconsistent with the Court's
analysis of first amendment issues raised in similar
contexts, but also sets a dangerous precedent by
lavishing unrestricted discretion in the hands of
prison administrators. Even more important, how-
ever, such an approach can only hamper recent
trends in the treatment and rehabilitation of prison
inmates.
RECENT TRENDS IN PRISON REFORM
Sociologists recognize that confinement institu-
tions may be characterized on a continuum accord-
ing to the relative emphasis the organization places
on either of two goals-custody and treatment.6
The first, the coercive model, is reflected in the
organization typical of the high custody prison. In
the high custody prison, both inmates and lower
echelon staff are deprived of decision-making op-
portunities by a myriad of rules that dictate or-
derly, predictable responses to almost every con-
ceivable situation.67 While information may flow
upward, only nonexplanatory directives filter down
to the lower echelon employees or inmates.68 Coer-
cion is the major means of control applied in such
organizations to assure fulfillment of the major
organizational task-keeping inmates in.69 By con-
65 416 U.S. at 405-06.
66 See R. LEGER & J. STRATTON, supra note 7; D. CRES-
SEY, HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS (1965); A. ETzIONI, A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS
(1961).
67 As Leger and Stratton have commented:
The high custody prison is governed by myriad
rules that dictate orderly, predictable responses to
almost every conceivable situation. The effect of
this complex system of regulations is to deprive both
inmates and lower echelon staff of any initiative or
decision-making opportunities. For the prison
guard, his occupational role instills a short term
time perspective; the routine and rituals of custody
force an extreme present orientation. After a period
of time in the institution, the guard himself becomes
dependent upon directives from above. This de-
pendency is accompanied by attitudes of subordi-
nation, a feeling that the people on top are smarter
than those on the bottom.
R. LEGER & J. STRATroN, supra note 7, at 4.
6 Id. at 2.
6 A. ETZIONI, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX
ORGANIZATIONS (1961) reprinted in R. LEGER & J. STRAT-
TON, supra note 7, at 7, 9. Examples of coercive organiza-
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trast, in the purely therapeutic community, au-
thority and control are decentralized so that infor-
mation and decision-making are shared at all staff
levels. Since every staff member is considered part
of the rehabilitative effort, the communication
structure is bilateral in nature with information
flowing both up and down the administrative hi-
erarchy.70
A careful inspection of the characteristics of the
coercive model is certainly justified since criminol-
ogists find the correctional institution in America
to be the epitome of the coercive model. It has
been argued that:
[TJhe primary goal of prisons, in the eyes of the
general public as well as prison administrators, is
custodial control. They are evaluated and evaluate
themselves far more in terms of what does not go on
within the prison than on what does go on. More
specifically, the absence of violence, assaults, riots,
escapes, potentially damaging litigation in the
courts, and so on are far more salient concerns than
the viability or presence of rehabilitation or reso-
cialization programs ... 7'
The high custody institution engenders three basic
responses. First, coercive organizational structures
isolate at the bottom of a highly stratified system
those who are being processed. While the system
encourages adherence to an unusually formal and
rigid set of rules, regulations and policies, it also
tions are concentration camps, prisoner-of-war camps,
custodial mental hospitals, forced-labor camps, relocation
centers and the large majority of prisons.
7 R. LEGER &J. STRArTON, supra note 7, at 3.
71 C. THOMAS & D. PETERSON, supra note 11, at 33. See
G. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A
MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON (1958). To argue that prisons
are too custodially oriented is not to suggest that custody
goals are unnecessary in the prison context. All organi-
zations must pursue some types of goals that relate to the
maintenance of control over the activities of their partic-
ipants. But Thomas and Peterson have made it clear
that:
[O]rganizational effectiveness is likely to be im-
paired when the attainment of control goals is felt
to be so problematic that unusually large propor-
tions of organizational resources must be allocated
to the acquisition of the necessary level of control
over those being processed....
Thus, it is not that the desire or need for the
acquisition and maintenance of social control over
inmates is detrimental; it is the degree of emphasis
placed on this processing prerequisite and the man-
ner in which the organization is structured in its
attempt to serve this goal that is at issue.
C. THOMAS & D. PETERSON, supra note 11, at 22, 26. See
also Baker, Inmate Self-Government, 55 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S.
39, 42 1964).
serves to inhibit communication between staff and
inmates.' Secondly, the alienation stimulated by
the system's rigidity and structure tends to weaken
prosocial attitudes and behavior that inmates may
have had prior to their entry into the prison.
Inmates will band together, formulating an orga-
nization of criminal values in clearcut opposition
to the values of conventional society and to prison
officials as representative of that society. 3 The
literature suggests that "prolonged confinement
fosters high levels of integration into an inmate
society within which a broad spectrum of essen-
tially antisocial attitutes and behavior are system-
atically reinforced." 74
Finally, researchers have found that the more
strictly administrators control the institution, the
greater the agression expressed by inmates against
both staff and other inmates.7s More than one
researcher has concluded that "[t]he proportion of
disciplinary problems to total prison population is
roughly dependent upon the level of custodial
control and its oppressiveness."
76
The coercive institutional model, in part because
it fosters the alienating responses discussed above,
has been found to be incompatible with the reha-
bilitative goals of correctional institutions. While
the relationship between guards and inmates in
custodial institutions is characterized by hostility,
mistrust, and suspicion, sociologists have argued
that a "positive and co-operative type of staff-
inmate relationship is a prerequisite for ... treat-
72 See C. THOMAS & D. PETERSON, supra note 11, at 39,
42 and R. LEGER &J. STRATrON, supra note 7, at 28.
73 In 1942, Norman Polansky directed a study to de-
termine the effects of different kinds of prison "atmo-
spheres" on the structure of the inmate community. At
that time, he concluded, in part, that "the more onerous
one makes prisons, the more will he facilitate the process
of atomization and social disruption." Polansky, The
Prison as an Autocracy, 33 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 16, 22
(1942).
Not long after Polansky's study, Lloyd Ohlin, in de-
scribing the characteristics of the inmate subculture,
wrote, "The [inmate] code represents an organization of
criminal values in clear cut opposition to the values of
conventional society, and to prison officials as represent-
atives of that society." L. OHLIN, SOCIOLOGY AND THE
FIELD OF CORRECTIONS 28-29 (1956). Since then, others
have recognized that this characterization is "consistent
with the preponderance of the research literature." C.
THOMAS & D. PETERSON, supra note 11, at 46.74 C. THOMAS & D. PETERSON, supra note 11, at 46.
75 See, e.g., Polansky, supra note 73, at 21.
76 Fox, Analysis of Prison Disciplinary Problems, 49 J. CRIM.




ment goals."' Sociologists agree that treatment
programs in high custody prisons are bound to
fail. 78 It has been stressed that:
correction of the offender can occur only under the favorable
conditions in treatment-orientated institutions or in the com-
munity at large ... [T]reatment programs, which
require such factors as decentralized control, affec-
tive relationships between staff and clients, and a
relatively egalitarian atmosphere, are simply not
compatible with the organizational environment
fostered by the goal of custody.7
Since offenders are believed to be persons who have
been unable to make socially acceptable decisions
in the past, it is argued that custodial prisons,
organized with a view toward minimizing offender
decision-making, serve only to reduce inmates to a
state of dependencys ° Psychological maturity can-
not develop in institutions where communication
between staff and inmates as well as between in-
mates is restricted or unfriendly, and where deci-
sion-making and autonomy are sacrificed for the
security offered by rules and regimen.
While many criminologists have recognized the
relationship between high custody prisons and the
failure of treatment programs, others have begun
to realize that increased participation by inmates
in decision-making can forestall the periodic out:
bursts of collective violence that have plagued
many American prisons in recent years. Vernon
Fox may have summarized the relationship be-
77 Berk, Organizational Coals and Inmate Organizations, 71
AM. J. OF Soc. 522 (1966) reprinted in R. LEGER & J.
STRATrON, supra note 7, at 33, 36. See also J. E. BAKER,
supra note 3, at 20.
7s According to Thomas and Peterson, "correctional
failure is to be expected when the organizations involved
adopt organizational structures that are not designed to
facilitate the pursuit of for want of a better term are often
referred to as prosocial changes in the attitudes, values,
and behavior of inmates." C. THOMAS & D. PETERSON,
supra note 11, at 21.See also D. Cressey, Prison Organizations,
in J. MARCH, HANDBOOK OF OROANIZATIONS (1965) re-
printed in R. LEGER & J. STRATTON, supra note 7, at 20.
7 R. LEGER &J. STRATrON, supra note 7, at 6 (emphasis
in the original).
80 See D. Cressey, Prison Organizations, in J. MARCH,
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS (1965) reprinted in R.
LEGER &J. STRATTON, supra note 7, at 20. Sutherland and
Cressey have argued that one of the reasons for self-
government programs for prisoners is "if prisoners are to
be reformed, they must be permitted to participate in
social situations which are to some extent representative
of the kinds of noncriminal social interaction in which
they will be expected to participate upon release." E.
SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOCY 523 (9th Ed.
1974).
tween custodial institutions and collective violence
best: "The way to make a bomb is to build a strong
perimeter and generate pressure inside. Similarly,
riots occur in prisons where oppressive pressures
and demands are generated in the presence of
strong custodial containments. Riots are reported




It is clear that there exists a tenuous peace
between inmates and their custodians in all too
many American prisons82 For example, the Special
Committee on Attica examined the causes of the
outbreak of violence occurring at the Attica prison
several years ago and found that "most correction
officers were not equipped by training to commu-
nicate to their inmate charges, and did not consider
it their duty to understand or to resolve inmate
problems. ' "s The Commission found that rules at
Attica were poorly communicated, often petty,
selectively enforced, and perpetuated a system of
favoritism, harrassment, and discrimination."
Even where seemingly arbitrary rules had a legiti-
mate basis in security, they were rarely explained
to inmates. A deep mistrust between inmates was
found to be equally prevelant, surfacing when
rioting inmates were found to be unwilling to let
representative inmates negotiate an agreement
with officials anywhere but in front of inmates,
hostages and newsmen.S
Conditions at Attica were not unique to that
institution. The Commission found that "the prob-
"I Fox, Why Prisoners Riot, 35 FED. PROBATION 9 (1971).
Others have recognized the relationship between the
maximum custody prison and the collective type of riot
in prisons. See Hartung & Floch, A Social-Psychological
Analysis of Prison Riots: An Hypothesis, 47 J. CRM. L.C. &
P.S. 51, 56 (1957) and C. THOMAS & D. PETERSON, supra
note 11, at 49.
82 P. KEvE, PRISON LIFE AND HUMAN WORTH 52 (1974).
According to Keve, "The major impediment to any effort
to ameliorate this general problem is that inmates and
guards have such widely different perceptions of what is
going on, and each has so little capacity to grasp the
viewpoint of the other."
8 ATTICA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK
STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA xv (1972) [herein-
after cited as ATrIcA REPORT].
8' Id. at 74, 75. The Commission on Attica emphasized
that "[r]ules assume a special prominence in prisons,
where adherence to unvarying routines reassures the
security conscious correction staff." Just as inmates had
a difficult time understanding the prison regulations
"[i]n the absence of generally understood guidelines,
correction officers had great discretion in interpreting
and enforcing the rules." Id. at 74-75.
85 Id. at 209. See Coulson, Justice Behind Bars: Time to
Arbitrate, 59 A.B.A. J. 612 (1973).
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lems in that institution at that time are sufficiently
representative of the prison universe to justify some
generalization. " 86 In essense, the Commission con-
cluded that the present system, by frustrating the
opportunities for inmates to redress wrongs and
assume some control over their lives in prison has
merely served to increase the threats to prison
internal security.87 Indeed, "the lesson of Attica"
has been echoed elsewhere. In Landman v. Peyton,
for instance, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized that "Experience teaches that nothing
so provokes trouble for the management of a penal
institution as a hopeless feeling among inmates
that they are without opportunity to voice griev-
ances or to obtain redress for abusive or oppressive
treatment."ss In the absence of other tools, disorder
and insurrection become the only method for cre-
ating public awareness and effecting change.8
9
Investigators in search of a cure for collective
violence in correctional institutions have recently
urged that inmate participation in the decision-
making process not only be fostered, but also that
inmates be encouraged to participate collectively in
the administration of the correctional institution.
Vernon Fox, for one, argues that at the very least,
6 AiTicA REPORT, supra note 83, at xii.
87 Id. at xvi.
88370 F.2d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 881 (1966), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 939 (1968).
89 See W. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 150
(1966). Professor Gellhorn explained that: "riots and
'strikes' in state prisons, where they occur far more fre-
quently than in similar federal institutions, may reflect
the inadequacy of the available grievance mechanisms;
they seem chiefly designed to draw outside attention to
inside problems." Along these same lines, and expressing
a similar analysis, Corrections Magazine reported that:
Many recent prison disturbances have been attrib-
uted to the unwillingness of inmates to live under
monolithic control. After investigating the Attica
Prison uprising of 1971, for example, the McKay
Commission in New York concluded that one cause
of the rebellion was the lack of nonviolent ways for
inmates to express their accumulated grievances.
Moreover, most administrators recognize that in-
carceration builds frustration and that it makes
sense to provide an outlet for complaints. "A griev-
ance procedure [should be] the main method of
reducing conflict and tension in prison," says
George Nicolau, vice-president of the New York-
based Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolu-
tion (IMCR), a private disputesettlement agency....
In Nicolau's view, there are three options for
corrections policy: "coercion countered by resist-
ance; endless litigation [by prisoners]; or a mutual
recognition of legitimacy [by inmates and staff]
coupled with a mutually acceptable dispute settle-
ment system."
CORRECTIONS, supra note 13, at 29-30.
communication barriers must be broken down if
prison riots are to be eliminated: "[G]ood com-
munication can avoid the predisposing causes of
riot.... Prison riots can be eliminated when up-
ward and downward communication, combined
with discretionary use of authority, reduces the
probability ofserious confrontation that should not
have to occur in a democratic society." °
However, the question that has bothered crimi-
nologists for years is how to establish more effective
lines of communication between inmates and the
administration. Reform minded corrections officers
have tried to promote the development of inmate
councils, but until recently most administrators
opposed such organizations. 9' Many prisons have
90 Fox, supra note 81, at 119. Fox carefully distinguishes
between predisposing and precipitating causes of riots.
Predisposing causes refer to those pressures that build up
the readiness to riot. In contrast, the precipitating cause
is the "trigger" or spontaneous precipitating event that
"detonates" or sets off the riot. When Fox speaks of a
need for greater communication between inmates and
prison staff, he is speaking of alleviating one of the
primary predisposing causes of prison riots.
Other commentators have recognized this close rela-
tionship between riots and insufficient communication
between inmates and prison staff. One author has written
that "Psychology tells us that the provision of channels
of communication so that an individual can be assured
of his being heard will provide the kind of satisfactory
emotional outlet that will make collective shouting un-
necessary." J. E. BAKER, supra note 3, at 2 1.
In 1973, the South Carolina Department of Correc-
tions gathered empirical data on collective violence in
United States correctional institutions by surveying
prisons throughout the country. The researchers hypoth-
esized that by comparing data gathered from prisons that
had had riots in recent years with prisons that had not,
they might uncover some of the variables in the prison
environment that increase the probability of riots. COL-
LECTIVE VIOLENCE IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONs: A
SEARCH FOR CAUSES, SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE RESEARCH PROJECT
(1973) [hereinafter cited as COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE]. The
study, in part, supported what Professor Emerson Smith
of the University of South Carolina had predicted. "[I]n
prisons, as in other social settings, riots are a result of
unresolved conflicts." Id at 34.
Above all else, the inmate organization can aid the
administration in apprising it of the issues that are gen-
erating the greatest heat in the prison. As Paul Keve has
explained, inmates "need experience in the democratic
exercise of responsibility. If they are not given a legitimate
chance to voice their concerns and to work to improve
their condition, they will reach periodic boiling points
when they 'participate' in management destructively." P.
KEvE, PRISON LIFE AND HUMAN WORTH 155 (1974).
9 3 j. E. Baker, in THE RIoT To PARTICIPATE, reports
that to a great extent views and positions on the use and
value of inmate advisory councils vary depending on the
1979]
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some form of grievance mechanism, but most are
informal, 2 and all too often the complaint is heard
group or the purpose of the group doing the talking. It is
clear, however, that support for inmate councils has only
recently shown any positive gains. J. E. BAKER, supra note
3, at 244-45.
One reason inmate advisory councils have received so
little support from correctional staff is that the councils
traditionally have failed to either be representative of the
inmate population or improve staff-inmate communica-
tion significantly. However, penologists searching for rea-
sons as to why the inmate advisory councils have failed,
have not criticized the basic premise of inmate represent-
ative organizations. Rather, they have pointed to the way
in which the councils were organized and managed to
explain the pattern of unsuccessful inmate councils. Suth-
erland and Cressey have explained that:
[Inmate councils have tended to become mere win-
dow dressing. They are made up principally of
inmates called "square Johns" or "do-rights," and
these types of inmates do not have the respect of
the real inmate leaders. They take actions which are
of little significance to the government of the prison,
and all their actions are subject to veto by the
warden.
E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 525 (9th ed.
1974).
J. E. Baker posits four reasons for why the inmate
council has been such a dismal failure. He suggests that
1) all too often the inmate councils depend on and,
indeed, operate only so long as a catalytic leader (admin-
istrator) sponsors the organization, 2) the councils have
emerged in prisons unprepared for inmate self-govern-
ment and without proper administrative support, 3) the
councils have been applied across the board to inmates
in every kind of institution and 4) the councils have been
used to permit inmates to discipline other inmates in the
prison. Baker comments that "Discipline is a part of the
treatment process which must be retained in toto by
prison personnel." Simply, inmates lack the objectivity
required of a disciplinarian. Baker, supra note 71, at 42.
For a general discussion of the drawbacks and flaws of
past and present attempts at democratization of the
prison, see Scharf, Democracy and Prison Reform: A Theory of
Democratic Participation in Prison, 55 PRISON JOURNAL 21
(1975).
92 Corrections Magazine reports:
A national survey conducted by the Center for
Correctional Justice in May, 1973, found that most
prison administrators believed they should adopt a
formal grievance procedure. Of the 209 institutions
responding to the survey, 166 reported that they
already had one. Half of these programs had begun
since March, 1972.
In evaluating the survey results, however, the
CCJ concluded that in many cases the existing,
informal grievance-resolving practices had been
hastily elevated to the status of formal procedures
with little substantive change. Most of the proce-
dures specified no time limits for responses to com-
plaints and many did not require grievances to be
written. Only fifty institutions had designated a
particular staff member to handle incoming com-
plaints.
that either grievances are not taken seriously or
that the right people never hear them.
9 3
In the past few years researchers have begun to
investigate the possibilities of harnessing the infor-
mal inmate social organization to promote more
effective lines of communication between staff and
inmates. An informal organization always has de-
veloped in correctional institutions. Inmates in
prison are isolated from society. The institutional-
ization that characterizes their life style generates
common problems of adjustment which stimulate
interaction and cooperation with those similarly
situated. And finally, inmates are members of an
institutional organization that can never fully an-
ticipate or control all behavior through the formal
system alone. The informal organization therefore
supplements the formal organization's task of
maintaining control over the behavior of inmates.M
Richard Cloward discovered that the "inmate
elite" in the informal prisoner organization consti-
"Everybody says that they have grievance mech-
anisms," says Micheal Keating, assistant director of
the CCJ, "but when you really look at them, they're
not too good. People want to do something, but
they haven't got the faintest idea what to do."
TIA DENENBERO, supra note 13, at 32.
' One prison research study found that inmates often
voice their discontent that "their opinions and problems
do not seem to reach the man in the top decision-making
post." COLLECTIvE VIOLENCE, supra note 90, at 24. Ronald
Goldfarb, in JAILS, echoed this finding when he quoted
a New York prosecutor's conclusion that,
When an inmate had a complaint or a grievance,
he felt that he had no recourse within the prison
system. If he wrote a complaint to a high ranking
officer or the warden, it had to be submitted, un-
sealed, to the guard on duty-who often was the
very individual against whom the complaint was
made. Most inmates believed that their complaints
never reached the staff members to whom they were
addressed and that a written complaint was an
exercise in futility. Many of them did not submit
complaints because they feared they would be fur-
ther harassed or even suffer loss of "good time"....
Some method of assuring inmates that com-
plaints and grievances will be forwarded to someone
with authority must be developed. Whatever
method is chosen, the inmates should be able to
believe that their complaints and grievances are
being properly reviewed by someone who is not
automatically prejudiced against them. Operatives
indicate that this would go a long way to reduce
the pettiness and frustration that exist within the
institution.
R. GOLDFARB, JAILS: THE ULTIMATE GHEmo 413-14
(1975).
Berk, Organizational Goals and Inmate Organization, 71
AMER. J. OF Soc. 522, reprinted in R. LEGER &J. STRAroN,
supra note 7, at 44.
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tuted "the single most important source of control
in the prison. ' '95 He found that not only did inmate
leaders play critical roles in averting riot condi-
tions, but they also served as an integrating force
to stabilize relations between inmates and staff.
According to Cloward, "[The inmate elite] stand
between the inmate system and the formal system,
binding them together. They mediate and modify
the diverse pressures emanating from each system.
They bring order to an otherwise strifeful situa-
tion.
96
Given the existence of an informal inmate social
organization and the stabilizing effect it has on the
prison environment, many criminologists have
urged that the inmate organization be utilized to
increase communication between inmates and the
administration and reduce the probability of col-
lective violence in the institution. As Vernon Fox
contends:
9'R. Cloward, THEORETICAL STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION OF THE PRISON, 20 48 (Social Services
Research Center 1960).
96Id. at 48. Many penologists attribute the informal
inmate self-government with maintaining peaceful prison
conditions during those periods when the organization
has been allowed to flourish. Indeed, two sociologists who
tried to find an explanation for the increased number of
prison riots in the early 1950's, discovered, in part, that
one of the significant reasons for the riots was that prison
authorities were dissolving the semi-official, informal in-
mate self-government. Hartung & Floch, supra note 81,
at 52. It is the researchers' belief that "Some form of
inmate self-government, whether unofficial or official, is
necessary for the maintenance of peace in a modern
maximum custody prison." ld. at 57. One of the charac-
teristics of the informal inmate social organization that
the researchers considered essential to the efficient ad-
ministration of the prison was the interest inmate leaders
had in the peaceful operation of the prison. They con-
cluded,
There is at least one way of minimizing the possi-
bility of the collective type of riot recurring, assum-
ing that the fortress type of prison will be retained
for the great majority of prisoners. This is by ex-
ploiting inmate-leaders under official direction so that
they will once again have incentives for and a stake
in a smoothly-operating, peaceful prison.
Id at 57 (emphasis in the original).
Vernon Fox has echoed this same feature of the inmate
social organization. According to Fox:
The pattern in the Federal Bureau of Prisons and
some other systems has been the inmate council,
where elected inmates discuss problems and appro-
priate policies with the prison administration, mak-
ing recommendations and suggestions.... Regard-
less ofhow it is organized, it should promote upward
and downward communication between inmates
and prison administration and it should provide the
inmate leadership with a vested interest in the status
quo.
Fox, supra note 81, at 118.
Inmate leadership is present in all prisons, as lead-
ership is present in all groups of people. The con-
structive use of inmate leadership is an obvious way
to avoid riots. Some type of inmate self-government
that involves honest and well supervised elections
of inmate representatives to discuss problems, make
recommendations and, perhaps, even to take some
responsibilities from the administration could be
helpful.'
It has also been noted that inmate self-government
can further the rehabilitation process of inmates by
allowing inmates to participate in social situations
which are to some extent "representative of the
kinds of noncriminal social interaction in which
they will be expected to participate upon release.
' 98
Despite the support that criminologists have
given inmate self-government proposals, there re-
mains a "Catch 22" quality to the issue. Just as
researchers came to the conclusion that the infor-
mal inmate organization can be a stabilizing force
in the prison environment, they also found that the
structure of the informal inmate system is a direct
reflection of the formal organizational structure of
the prison. 9 When prison officials rely heavily on
97 Id. See also E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESsEY, CRIMINOL-
oy 523 (9th ed. 1974).
9 E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 523
(9th ed. 1974). J. E. Baker adds,
[The advisory council represents one of the most
satisfactory devices for encouraging the inmates of
a prison to think constructively about their own
institutional environment and provides a means by
which inmates may share the responsibility with the
staff of making the prison a better place in which to
live.
Baker, supra note 71, at 47. See generally Meier, Violence
and Unrest in Pnsons, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINm'Y-Nilms
ANNUAL CONGRESS OF THE AMERICAN CORRECTION Asso-
CIATION 61 (1969).
Admittedly, one ofthe fears that prison administrators
have is that acquiescence to the demands of prisoners will
necessarily lead to greater violence. C. David Garson, for
one, has directly challenged this assumption:
First, there is no evidence that when prisoners'
demands are granted there is either more or less
rioting than when they are ignored. Second, to the
extent that officials have granted prisoners' de-
mands, prison reform has been advanced. Indeed,
prison rioting has been one of the main vehicles for
prison reform, each riot series reawakening and
promoting further reform advances.
Garson, Force Versus Restraint in Prison Riots, 18 CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY 411, 419 (1972).
"See Berk, Organizational Goals and Inmate Organization,
71 AMER. J. OF Soc. 522 (1966); Street, The Inmate Group
in Custodial and Treatment Settings, 30 AMER. Soc. R. 40
(1965); Vinter & Janowitz, Effective Institutions forJuvenile




coercive power, adopt a highly centralized power
structure and create a rigidly stratified organiza-
tional structure, it appears probable that a com-
parable and highly oppositional informal organi-
zation will emerge among inmates. While inmate
leaders in custodial prisons assist in the mainte-
nance of internal order by regulating inmate be-
havior, it is usually "at the cost of the corruption
of the formal authority system. " 'I °° In contrast, the
informal organization in treatment institutions
tends to be supportive of the official structure0 1
and informal leaders are likely to be more cooper-
ative than their counterparts in custodially ori-
ented prisons."°e The less formal the methods of
control, and the more the treatment needs of in-
mates are considered in the institution's demands
for conformity, the less resentful and hostile the
inmate organization becomesy °3 Conversely, com-
mentators report that:
As the deprivations which are imposed become more
pronounced, so does the probability that an inmate
subculture will emerge, a subculture within which
a premium is placed on a variety of attitudes, values,
and behavior that are in direct opposition to the
prison, its policies, its programs and its staff."'
Research into the nature of inmate organizations
suggests a most disturbing dilemma. On the one
hand, the harnessing of the informal inmate orga-
nization has been cited as the primary mechanism
for fostering communication between inmates and
the administration in an effort to stabilize the
prison environment and reduce the probability of
inmate collective violence. Yet, on the other hand,
those institutions that are most prone to inmate
riots are the very prisons which breed inmate sub-
cultures that maintain a tenuous stability through
a coerciveness antithetical to treatment goals and
socially acceptable values. So long as prisons main-
tain custodial environments, centralizing control in
a highly structured, coercive organization and de-
priving inmates of decision-making opportunities,
prison conditions will generate an oppositional,
informal, inmate organization and treatment pro-
grams will chronically fall short of expectations.
10o Berk, supra note 99, reprinted in R. LEOER & J.
STRATrON, supra note 7, at 33, 46.
o' Id. at 44.
'02 Id. at 42.
'03 Id. at 46.
'0o C. THOMAS & D. PETERSON, supra note 11 at 50-51.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Jones could be
narrowly viewed as simply limiting prisoners' first
amendment freedoms of speech and association in
the context of prisoner unions. It is contended,
however, that the decision will have an impact on
prisoners' rights that extends far beyond the rights
of inmates to organize within prison walls. The
Jones decision suggests that the Court will assume
a deferential attitude toward prison administrators'
fears, when prisoners' assertions of first amendment
rights threaten the order and regimen of the high
custody institution. Although research continues to
reveal the limits of the high custody institution in
rehabilitating criminal offenders and maintaining
order within the prison walls, the Court's deferen-
tial stance all but guarantees the continued exis-
tence of prisons characterized by inadequate com-
munications structures and of counter-productive
treatment environments. Furthermore, if, as pen-
ologists increasingly argue, the high custody prison
is a breeding ground for collective violence, then
one can predict that unreviewed prison regulations
restricting the availability of grievance mechanisms
for isolated and alienated inmates can only serve
to foster more frequent disturbances and riots in
correctional institutions.
Prison administrators are fond of announcing
the adoption of new rehabilitation techniques and
the implementation of new treatment programs in
the prisons they oversee. The very term "correc-
tional" institution is a reflection of the language of
reform that is used to describe the goals of the
modem American prison. Yet reality demands that
we more honestly evaluate the role of the prison in
contemporary society. It is time that we heed the
warning of penologists that so long as effective
custodial control is the primary goal of the Amer-
ican prison, rehabilitation cannot take place. If
prison reformists wishfully thought that at least
some progress had been made toward establishing
less restrictive treatment environments in recent
years, the Supreme Court, in Jones, corrected that
view and removed all doubt that custodial concerns
shall indeed control the direction of prison condi-
tions in the years to come.
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